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THE MARKET FOR PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW SERVICES
SCOTT CUMMINGS*
I want to thank Susan for inviting me to speak on this, my first American
Association of Law Schools panel. I am here to discuss some early stage
progress I’m making on a project I’m working on in connection with a
program honoring one of my very great senior colleagues, Joel Handler.
His mold-breaking empirical work on public interest law remains both
field-defining and inspirational to all of us who care about access to justice.
When I look at his seminal 1978 empirical study of public interest law,
one of the important contributions that stands out is that Handler and his
collaborators conceptualized public interest law as an “activity” rather than
an organizational objective—an activity that “involve[s] the use of legal
tools and ha[s] a high ratio of potential external benefits to potential total
benefits.”1 Putting aside the contested nature of the definition itself, the
important insight was that public interest law was conduct—a service—
provided across different practice sites by lawyers who may or may not be
ideologically committed to the representation’s ultimate objectives. As
Handler noted, although public interest law activity occurred primarily in
the voluntary sector, it had analogues in the for-profit and public sectors
that invited careful study if one were to understand—in his terms—the
complex and interconnected “public interest law industry.”
The conception of my project is to take up Handler’s invitation in the
contemporary context. I do so with a similar approach to the definition of
public interest law: as the provision of legal services broadly defined to
advance some vision of the public good beyond mere client representation.
I am trying to follow in the footsteps of scholars like Deborah Rhode and
K.T. Albiston who have recently published important empirical work
analyzing the contemporary public interest field. They compare it back in
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1. Joel F. Handler et al., The Public Interest Law Industry, in PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 42 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1978)
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time to the way things were at the start of the public interest movement. I
would just note that this comparative impulse is, in part, a product of a
generational change that reflects a new generation of scholarly interest in
public interest law. This interest expresses an urge to study a field at the
end of its founding generation just as those who started 40 years ago are
now at their careers’ end. Rhode’s wonderful title of her Stanford Law
Review article, The Movement at Midlife, captures this.
To date, much of the research on the public interest law industry has
focused on the organization and practice of public interest law in the
NGO—or what Handler called the voluntary—sector, where legal aid
organizations and groups like the ACLU and LDF reside. This includes the
canonical critiques of public interest law, going back to Bell’s Serving Two
Masters, focusing on lawyers in these practice arenas.
Just to set the stage for a comparative framework, I put together what I
think is the best available evidence on the size of the NGO sector as it has
grown from the early public interest law movement to roughly the present.
If these figures are accurate, you see that NGO lawyers remain a small
fraction of all lawyers, but have grown in relative proportion rather
significantly, nearly five times, since 1975. This is consistent with our
general impressions that the NGO sector is becoming more developed and
professionalized.
In this project, I am coming at the industry from a different angle,
focusing specifically on the development of public interest law within the
for-profit private sector. Following Heinz & Laumann, I depict public
interest law as encompassing a corporate and non-corporate hemisphere (in
terms of client base). A lot of great work has been conducted as of late on
the institutional development of pro bono; I’m interested in building on that
work in two ways. First, by viewing pro bono as part of a larger for-profit
sector that also includes the fee-generating work of so-called private public
interest firms; and, second, by attempting to make some historical
comparisons. The questions I want to ask are, first, how has the for-profit
sector changed, looking specifically at the causes of change, (what are the
factors that have contributed to its development?) and the nature of change
(how is for-profit public interest law different now than it was 40 years
ago?)? Second, what are the consequences of these changes?
The consequences are important, not merely because they are
intellectually interesting, but because they go to the fundamental question
of what it means to have effective access to justice in our society. As you
all know, the access debate is often framed in terms of the market for legal
services, both as a cause of and a remedy for insufficient access. In terms
of causality, the argument holds that certain types of clients and causes are
underrepresented in the private market, causing a mismatch of supply and
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demand that creates a “justice gap” that the NGO sector attempts to bridge.
Because of resource constraints, these efforts never achieve ultimate
success.
In terms of responses to the justice gap, I think the private market is
generally viewed warily as a potential source of leverage, as a supplement,
but ultimately as an unworthy substitute. The private market is viewed as
an unsatisfactory alternative for good-old-fashioned staffed public interest
law offices with committed, full-time attorneys whose job it is to advocate
for their designated causes and clients. Why? There are generally two
reasons that are given. One relates to the expertise or, to put in another
way, quality. Here, the notion is that full-time lawyers dedicated to
particular causes or clients will be qualitatively better than private lawyers
who engage in such work part-time and ad hoc either through pro bono
service or via a voucher system like Judicare. The second argument against
market-based public interest law delivery relates to what I would call
substantive access, referring to the types of cases or matters that may be
brought from within a particular practice location. More directly, the
concern is that market-based public interest law delivery will likely
insufficiently attend to, or even ignore altogether, certain categories of
cases that just don’t make economic sense for for-profit firms to undertake.
These cases cannot be pursued satisfactorily either because they invite
objections from paying clients or because they don’t promise enough
attorney’s fees. It is the concern about substantive access, for instance, that
is raised when people talk about the impact of “positional conflicts” on
large-firm pro bono work. The important question, I would suggest, is
whether those cases and matters “left out” of the pro bono system get
picked up elsewhere and, if not, where the industry-wide gaps are.
It is important to emphasize that categorical limitations on advocacy are
not the sole province of the private sector. As we all know, Legal Services
Corporation (LSC) funded groups are restricted from many areas deemed
politically volatile or unpopular. In contrast to market-based delivery,
LSC’s limitation is a political constraint that in theory can be undone,
rather than a fundamental structural feature intrinsic to the very nature of
for-profit practice. It is perhaps for this reason that opponents of federal
support for legal aid have at times sought to channel resources out of
staffed offices and into for-profit firms where it is sometimes presumed that
representation would take on a less radical—or politically liberal—cast.
The premise that pro bono is less politically threatening, of course, is not
entirely true, as evidenced by the fact that large law firms have in fact done
quite radical and consequential pro bono work. However, the focus on
different delivery systems crystallizes the key point here: that the funding
mechanism for public interest law influences the nature of the services
rendered, perhaps profoundly so. Thus, where the distributional balance is
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ultimately struck across the private, for-profit, voluntary, and public
sectors—that is, how much and what type of public interest law activity is
located in each—decisively affects the nature and quality of legal
representation. In the access debate, I don’t think it is enough to say “we
need more” services—we of course do, but that formulation begs the
question of what type of “more” we need as well as where it should be
targeted.
At least in theory, recognizing that there may be insurmountable
empirical limitations, we should be able to figure out and compare public
interest law service provisions in different parts of the industry, and create
a distribution showing how much gets done and where.
From there, we should be able to make assessments about the
appropriate balance. Ultimately, if we want to get the balance “right”, even
if we might disagree about what that optimal balance may be, we need to
know three empirical facts about the entire public interest law industry that
we currently do not: (1) how much public interest law is currently
dispensed across sectors, (2) how does it vary by type or substantive area,
and (3) how good is it, specifically, how does quality vary by sector?
I cannot answer these questions, but my project aims to move the ball
forward by trying to assemble the best available current evidence to shed
light on at least some of them. Let me tell you what I think we know so
far, starting with a very general observation, an “untested empirical hunch,”
and a hypothesis.
The observation is that there is a lot of public interest law activity going
on in the for-profit private sector. The hunch is that it has grown over time,
not only in absolute terms but relative to the size of the profession.
There is some corroboration for this hunch: just with respect to pro bono
service, for example, recent research on Am Law 200 firms shows that the
total pro bono hours produced by such firms increased by nearly eighty
percent between 1998 and 2005, while the per-lawyer average increased by
five hours. Through 2008, total pro bono hours increased nearly fifty
percent again and the average hours per attorney grew by another ten hours.
This leads to my hypothesis, which is that as we move from one type of
delivery system to another, we would expect to see changes in the quantity
and quality of services provided, depending on the distributional mix. The
basic idea is that the system of payment affects public interest law along at
least three dimensions: (1) the cases or matters that are brought, (2) the
degree to which lawyers feel accountable to clients, and (3) the nature of
the lawyer’s role (along the neutrality/non-neutrality spectrum) and tactics
(along the legal/non-legal advocacy spectrum). We could empirical test
whether this is true.
Let me now say a few things about what we know about the nature of
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market-based delivery in the United States. I’ll start with the pro bono
sector, which you’ll note, includes on the corporate side, large law firms
which have gotten the most attention, but also on the non-corporate side
small firms and even solo practitioners, who are motivated by very
different economic considerations.
This is data that I put together from two sources, the Handler study, and
a study of law firm time keeping practices done by a consulting firm and
published in an ABF journal. I am not quite sure what to make of the
Handler data, presented in his book with some palpable sense of outrage
that lawyers are only devoting 6% of their billable time to pro bono, which
by contemporary standards is quite large. Assuming a 2000 hour year, the
pro bono work would translate into an annual average of 120 hours. If you
multiply that by all private lawyers you get a huge amount of hours, a
significant number of full time equivalent (FTE) pro bono lawyers, and a
huge ratio of FTE pro bono lawyers to lawyers in the NGO sector: eight
and a half to one. Just compare the Darby data, which asked a slightly
different question (how many hours lawyers devoted to charitable,
community, or civic endeavor) and got a much lower number 30 hours per
lawyer.
The contemporary data is more solid and presented here. I break it down
between AmLaw data for the largest firms, in the first row, and American
Bar Association (ABA) data for all private lawyers, in the second. If you
compare to the size of the entire profession, you would see that FTE pro
bono lawyers are about one and half percent of all lawyers now. In the
early period, they were only about one percent, if you take the Darby data.
Part of the pro bono story relates to quantity (there is more), but part also
relates to location—there appears to be more done at the big firm level.
This is because there are more lawyers in the big firm (100+ lawyers)
sector, which increased 7 times between 1980 and 2000, and as the Am
Law data reveals, and they are doing more pro bono on average.
The relative change in the location of pro bono might affect the type and
quality of those pro bono services. In Handler’s study, he asked surveyed
lawyers to identify the types of organizations for which they did pro
bono—a high proportion indicated churches and nonpolitical community
groups.
What are the factors that drive the distribution of pro bono services at
large law firms now? Deborah Rhode and I tried to get at that question
with a study that we published last year based on a survey of pro bono
counsel at major law firms. These pro bono counsel positions have grown
significantly since the advent of AmLaw rankings in 1994.
In surveying counsel, one of the things we found, of course, is that pro
bono was limited by economic considerations. The distribution of cases
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was not just about economics; in addition, it reflected a sort of negotiation
among pro bono stakeholders. This negotiation is mediated by pro bono
counsel, who act as advocates for both increased quantitative investments
in pro bono as well as for certain type of cases. Ultimately, those with the
most power in the firms, the partners then the associates, dictate the
ultimate pro bono agenda, shaping pro bono around the economic needs of
the firm.
These needs include, as I have already mentioned, a sensitivity to client
interests (“do not sue clients”), but also to the recruitment and professional
development of firm lawyers. Indeed, when asked what was important in
determining the objectives and types of pro bono cases firms selected,
recruitment and professional development loomed large. How does this
affect the distribution of cases? We do not have good data to answer this
question, which remains a critical one for understanding the overall impact
of organized pro bono programs.
Let me try, in the short time I have left, to give you a sense of the other
part of the for-profit sector: so-called private public interest law firms.
When Handler did his study, he included “mixed firms,” “self-proclaimed
public interest law firms that provide legal services to private clients for
profit and use those earnings to finance legal activities of the public interest
law type.”2 He found: “Most of these firms are in the nation’s largest
cities, in the Northeast and in Washington, D.C.; but there are mixed public
interest firms in all parts of the county. Our data indicate that the firms are
usually small; the average is 5 full-time lawyers. No firm had more than 10
lawyers, and most are staffed entirely by full-time lawyers.”3 I set out to
find resources that would get me as close as possible to the Handler
conception, i.e., those firms in the for-profit private sector that self-identify
as firms working in the public interest. My pursuit led to one important,
albeit still partial, data source: the directory of the National Lawyers Guild,
which holds itself out as the oldest public interest/human rights bar in the
US. The Guild directory is imperfect since it is likely to be both over and
under-inclusive. But it provides one window on firms that hold themselves
out as pursuing objectives related to the public interest. My preliminary
data shows some differences from the Handler study. The geographic mix
of firms is different: 60 firms in California, 9 in the District of Columbia,
30 in Massachusetts, 36 in New York. And the most popular practice areas
appear to be slightly different—with civil rights, criminal law, and
employment law topping the list—perhaps reflecting the importance of feeshifting statues, as well as subsidies for public defense.
So this is the information we have so far, but it is far from adequate. I
2. Id. at 42.
3. Id. at 113.
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am going to end with questions and would invite you to help me think
through some of the issues I’ve raised to more toward a better
understanding of how organizational form affects the distribution of public
interest law. These include:
On quantity: How can we get the best picture of how much public
interest law the for-profit sector provides?
On substance: What gets left out of market-based delivery and why?
On quality: How do we figure out what the private lawyers do well and
what they do poorly in terms of service provision?
Thank you.
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